

27 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Remarks on Revised Paper on Stalin's Death

1. This paper represents a step forward in planning for Stalin's death inasmuch as it contains a section listing objectives to be sought. However, the statement of objectives is too generalized to serve as the basis for the formulation of significant political and propaganda action.

2. A psychological warfare program geared to these objectives would seem to have as little chance of success as a big-game hunter who favors a shotgun over a rifle on the theory that the wider the shot spatters the more chance he has of hitting something.

3. I think, instead, we should adopt the rifle approach to this problem--that is, we should avail ourselves of intelligence estimates on what schisms may exist in the presidium, what chances the army may have of taking over, how much the people might be expected to support a military coup and who would be most likely to give the U.S.S.R. a more friendly foreign policy. Then, on the basis of these reports, we should make a definitive plan for backing the group or person most acceptable to us.

4. If it is decided that the army is the prospect most likely to give the U.S.S.R. a more friendly orientation toward the United States, then our message to the Soviet people would be aimed at getting them to support the army and would not be made up of generalizations about passive resistance, as in this paper.

✓ 5. If intelligence is unable to provide such estimates, we should arbitrarily decide whom we want in control and then concentrate our planning on how to achieve this.

6. This type of approach would mean gambling on considerable success or complete failure. But following the approach in this paper would mean that no matter how cleverly our objectives were pursued and how well our propaganda themes were accepted, we would end up, at best, with confusion in the U.S.S.R. or with a situation in which we had neutralized the effectiveness of prospective power groups.

7. We do not


TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070002-6

SECURITY INFORMATION

7. We do not feel, however, that propaganda guidance should await the completion of this plan but rather that there is an immediate need for general guidance to cover the event of Stalin's death. This should be formulated immediately so that, if Stalin were to die while an integrated plan is still aborning, controlled media would know what lines to take. When the overall plan is fully articulated, this preliminary general guidance could then be tailored more closely to the specific objectives envisaged in the plan.

8. The latter part of this paper contains a number of interesting suggestions on ways to proceed with the plan which could be adapted for use in the type of plan suggested here.



Psychological Staff Division

25X1A

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070002-6

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY ____ OF ____ COPIES